JP , Geospatial Intelligence in Joint Operations. JP , Countering Air and Missile Threats. JP , Military Deception. JP Counter Improvised Explosive. Device (C-IED) Awareness. SM Timothy POWER, CAN-A. NSO Joint Effective Risk Communicatinos for the Counter Improvised. Joint Publication Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Operations. pages; For Official Use Only; January 9, Download.
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It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and provides the doctrinal basis for the planning and conduct of joint C-IED operations.
At the lowest echelons, jpp local cell members are detectable, targetable, and replaceable. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.
It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders JFCs and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. kp
While ideology may produce recruits, they have to eat, obtain weapons, travel, and build, transport, and emplace bombs. U This publication provides joint doctrine for planning and executing counter-improvised 3-155.1 device C-IED operations. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans.
But as networks function and move resources information, money, supplies, recruits from the highest to the lowest echelons, these activities are detectable and targetable. Therefore, eliminating individuals only provides temporary and limited solutions to countering IED threats.
To avoid detection and attack, adversary networks camouflage and constantly revise, or adapt, their TTP. However, C-IED operations must be accomplished within the context of successfully targeting the broader adversary infrastructure.
It outlines responsibilities, provides command and control 33-15.1, discusses organizational options, details the C-IED process and attack the network methodology, and introduces models for coordinating with C-IED supporting organizations. U This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
At the highest echelons, the leadership rarely communicates jjp and generally uses trusted aides and couriers to provide broad guidance to subordinates and direct the network.